Introduction
This note is an attempt to provide an overview of and critically analyse the European Court of Human Rights' (ECtHR) most recent case law on the responsibility of member states of international and supranational organisations. The focus will lie on the Court's application of its Bosphorus decision in later cases and how it distinguished the Bosphorus case law from the more recent Behrami decision.
The Bosphorus case was concerned with the impounding of an aircraft by Ireland on the basis of on an obligation in an EC regulation, which itself was based on a Resolution by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
1 Because the aircraft was impounded by Irish authorities on Irish territory, the ECtHR had no difficulty finding that the applicant company was within Ireland's jurisdiction according to Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) so that Ireland could be held responsible for impounding the aircraft and any violation of the ECHR that arose therefrom. The ECtHR then famously held that the Contracting Parties to the ECHR are not prohibited from transferring sovereign power to an international organisation but that they remain responsible for all acts and omissions of their organs 'regardless whether the act or omission was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations'. 2 The Court went on to state that as long as the international organisation 'is considered to protect fundamental rights [...] in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides' the Court will presume that a State has acted in compliance with the Convention, where the state had no discretion in implementing the legal whether that presumption has been rebutted in the concrete case before it because of a manifest deficit in the protection of human rights. In the Bosphorus case, the ECtHR considered the human rights protection afforded by the European Union to be equivalent to that of the Convention, so that the presumption applied. The Court saw no reason why the protection in that case could be considered manifestly deficient. 5 Therefore, the ECtHR held that the interference with the applicant's property rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR was justified. In Bosphorus, the Court thus offered an important clarification to its earlier ruling in Matthews. 6 Matthews was the The Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to international organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be "secured".
Member States' responsibility therefore continues even after such a transfer. 7 In contrast to Matthews, the violation in Bosphorus could not be directly found in EU primary legislation, i.e. the treaties, but in secondary legislation, i.e. an act adopted by the organisation itself. 8 The main difference with regard to the protection of human rights is that acts of secondary legislation can be challenged before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). While Matthews established that the member states of the EU remain generally accountable for human rights violations caused by the law of the European Union, the Bosphorus decision was seen as an attempt to accommodate the autonomy of the EU legal order with the premise set out in
Matthews.
9 Furthermore, it was submitted that the judgment had to be viewed in the specific context of an EU accession to the Convention 10 and of the potentially overlapping jurisdiction between the ECtHR and the ECJ.
11
The Bosphorus decision left a number of questions unanswered, some of which this note will attempt to answer in light of the latest case law, in which That provision requires that the applicants were 'within their jurisdiction'. The ECtHR held that the acts and omissions of these troops were attributable to the United Nations because the Security Council retained ultimate control over them. 17 The
Court went on to distinguish the case from the Bosphorus case. There the measure had been carried out by the respondent state (Ireland) on its territory, so the Court did not consider that its jurisdiction ratione personae was an issue, even though the source of the respondent state's action was an EU regulation.
18
In the case of Behrami, however, the Court held that the actions and omissions could not be attributed to the respondent states. They did not take place on their territory or by virtue of a decision of their authorities. 19 The Court also pointed to the 'fundamental distinction' between the European Union and the UN and accorded great significance to the latter organisation's universal jurisdiction, which was 'fulfilling its imperative collective security objective'.
20
In Beric v Bosnia and Herzegovina, the fourth section of the Court applied Behrami.
21
The facts of both cases were very similar. However, in the most recent decision of Gasparini v Italy and Belgium, the second section of the Court offered a further distinction. 36 The subject of the case was another labour dispute, this time between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and an employee, Gasparini, regarding an increase in NATO's pension levy.
The applicant filed a complaint with the NATO Appeals Board (NAB). As the NAB's sessions are not held in public, the applicant claimed a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR. In that case, the Court offered a new reading of the Boivin, Connolly and Kokkelvisserij cases. As Gasparini concerned a labour dispute, one would have expected the Court to declare the application inadmissible ratione personae.
However, it distinguished the cases of Boivin and Connolly from the case of
Gasparini. While in the earlier cases the complaints were directed against a particular decision of an organ of an organisation, in Gasparini the complaint was directed against a structural deficit in the internal mechanism for conflict resolution.
Thus the Court went on to examine whether there was a manifest deficit in the protection of fundamental rights, which it could not detect.
B. Comment
After Bosphorus, it was speculated that the Court would apply the Bosphorus Connolly case concerned a structural deficit rather than an independent decision by an organ of an international organisation. It therefore resembles Gasparini rather than Boivin. Moreover, in drawing this distinction, the ECtHR failed to consider Biret.
In that case the Court held that the lack of access to a court or tribunal before which directives could directly be challenged was due to an alleged deficit in the Community judicial order and thus could not be attributed to the respondent states.
52
The Court did not consider that the respondent states agreed to that deficit when mécanisme de règlement des conflits du travail interne à l'OTAN n'était pas en contradiction flagrante avec les dispositions de la Convention.", cf. 
Equivalent Protection and Manifest Deficit

A. The requirement of a previous ECJ decision
One of the questions left open after the Bosphorus judgment was how the Court would deal with the requirement of a manifest deficiency in the protection of Convention rights. In that case the Court held that such a deficiency could not be found because 'there was no dysfunction of the mechanisms of control of the observance of Convention rights'. 53 In so finding, the Court explicitly relied on the previous preliminary ruling of the ECJ in the matter. The case of Coopérative des agriculteurs de Mayenne however suggests that a previous ruling is not always necessary.
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In that case the applicant farming cooperatives complained of an infringement of a number of their Convention rights because the French National Dairy Board requested the payment of a certain sum of money because the applicants had exceeded their milk quotas. The legal bases for these milk quotas were three detailed Community regulations, which provided for a levy to be paid by the producer where the quotas were exceeded. The French Conseil d'Etat did not make a reference to the ECJ but decided the case based on these Community regulations. The ECtHR nonetheless applied the Bosphorus principle and held that there was no manifest deficiency in the protection of the applicants' Convention rights. One could argue that this ruling is astonishing because the Community judicial system, the existence of which was one of the main reasons why the Court found the protection offered to be equivalent, was not involved in the actual case. On the other hand, the fact that the Conseil d'Etat did not make a reference to the ECJ in the present case does not necessarily mean that fundamental rights were not protected. The domestic courts are part of the Community legal system in the wider sense. They are bound to apply Community law and respect its supremacy over domestic law. Thus the domestic courts are required to examine whether a piece of Community legislation violates fundamental rights and, should the situation arise, make a reference to the ECJ. Therefore, the Court was correct in not finding a manifest deficiency in the lack of a reference alone. However, it would have been preferable, for the sake of clarity, if the Court had addressed this question. Instead, it remained completely silent on this point.
B. The need to plead a manifest deficit
In Boivin, the Court made it clear that an applicant must establish or at least allege that the protection of fundamental rights is not equivalent to that of the Convention system. As the applicant had failed to do so, it did not examine whether the protection was manifestly deficient in that case. These remarks must, of course, be considered to have been made obiter dictum as the Court then ruled that the action was not attributable to the respondent states. In Gasparini the Court repeated this statement and it can therefore be concluded that the Court requires that an applicant at least claims either that the protection offered by the organisation is not equivalent or that it is manifestly deficient. This means that the Court will not examine this question proprio motu. Rather, the burden of proof for the existence of a manifest deficit is on the applicant.
C. The scrutiny carried out by the ECtHR
A further issue is the level of scrutiny carried out by the ECtHR. In Bosphorus, the Court was very quick to conclude that the protection offered by the European The Court merely pointed to the nature of the interference, the general interest pursued and to the ruling of the ECJ. This created the impression that the Court's test would be rather superficial, especially in light of the cursory proportionality test carried out by the ECJ in its own Bosphorus ruling. 56 It was thus suggested that the more impressive human rights analysis in the Advocate General's opinion might have saved the ECJ's decision from greater Strasbourg scrutiny.
57
The first time the
Court applied the Bosphorus test was in the case of Coopérative des Agriculteurs de
Mayenne. In that case, the Court relied on the Grand Chamber's finding in
Bosphorus that the presumption of protection of Convention rights applied to the European Community. With regard to the rebuttal of the presumption the Court entered into a discussion of whether the aim pursued by the levy was legitimate and
proportionate. For that purpose the Court referred to its decision in Procola, which dealt with a very similar levy.
58
This approach suggests that the Court properly examined whether the levy was justified or not.
In Biret, the Court also relied on the Grand Chamber's finding that the protection offered by the Community is equivalent. In contrast to the case just mentioned, the In contrast to Biret, the scrutiny carried out in Kokkelvisserij was much more in-depth.
The applicant had argued that the protection afforded by the European Union was manifestly deficient in the light of the Court's judgment in Vermeulen. 60 The Court had found that the lack of a right to respond to the submissions made by the Belgian In a similar vein, in Gasparini the Court discussed in quite some detail why it was justified that the procedure before the NAB was not public. 
Conclusion
The Bosphorus and Matthews case law contradicted the traditional view in public international law that members of international organisations cannot be held responsible for acts or omissions by these organisations because they enjoy a legal personality distinct from that of their member states. 64 Therefore, the extension of the more traditional Behrami case to cases where there was no domestic act or omission by a Contracting State can be interpreted as a return to the more traditional view regarding the responsibility of contracting states for acts and omissions committed by international organisations of which they are members. This distinction now seems to be well-established. As a consequence of that case law, action taken by the EU under the Common Foreign and Security Policy will not be subjected to 64 On this question cf. review by the ECtHR, as it will not involve acts or omissions by EU member states but rather by the EU itself. This is especially relevant for future missions carried out in the framework of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. Violations of the ECHR by forces under the command of the EU will not be attributable to the member states and any complaints directed against them will be held inadmissible by the ECtHR. The summary of the case law provided above, has also revealed that there is still some inconsistency in the Court's case law involving the responsibility of member states for acts and omissions of international organisations: The cases of
Gasparini and Biret could have been decided differently in light of the Matthews case.
Moreover, the Court in Gasparini did not establish that the first stage of the Bosphorus test, the existence of an equivalent protection, was satisfied.
Furthermore, in neither Boivin nor Connolly, did the Court explain why it extended its
Behrami reasoning to cases not concerning the United Nations.
Despite these shortcomings, the conditions for the applicability of the Bosphorus Despite the clarifications found in the case law discussed, some points remain to be resolved. One question raised in particular by Gasparini is whether, apart from the EU and NATO, member states of other international organizations will benefit from the presumption. A further point, which will have to be addressed is whether the 65 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights entered into force with the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009.
